considered with the more standard equity and efficiency effects. The principal obstacle to implementing this framework for analysis has been the dearth of quantitative information about the resource cost implications of simplification plans. Although recent work by Slemrod and Sorum (1984) has provided useful estimates of the total resource cost of the current U.S. income tax system, what is more important for policy purposes is the expected change in the resource cost due to a proposed tax reform.
The purpose of this article is to provide information on the determinants of the compliance cost of income taxation that can be used to predict the probable resource cost savings from tax simplification. These estimates are based on an econometric analysis of the tax-filing behavior in 1982 of a sample of Minnesota taxpayers. The article is arranged as follows. In Section 2, a simple theoretical model of tax-compliance behavior based on utility maximization is presented. The model is used to suggest the important determinants of compliance behavior to be considered in an empirical study and what the likely direction of influence is. Section 3 develops an empirical model that estimates the determinants of the choice of whether to itemize deductions and whether to hire professional tax advice, and the choice of how much time and money to spend on tax matters, conditional on whether itemization was chosen and/ or professional assistance was purchased. Section 4 describes the data for the analysis. In Section 5, the results of the econometric analyses are presented and discussed, and Section 6 briefly describes their implications for the resource saving from some radical tax simplification proposals and the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Section 7 concludes. The second part of the system models the decision of whether to purchase professional tax advice, conditional on the itemization status chosen. As with the itemization decision, it is posited that there is a latent variable (called either J* 11 or J*N. for itemizers and nonitemizers, respectively), which represents the propensity to pay for professional advice.
As before, H when either the probability of itemization or the probability of paying for professional assistance is overestimated.
The interpretation of the coefficients of each of the two selectivity variables is the estimated covariance between the error in the two relevant probit equations and the error in the ordinary least squares equation. The inner product of the two coefficient estimates and the expected value of the error terms is the estimate of the expected unobservable component. For each of the six equations, this value is very large in absolute value compared to the observed mean of the dependent variable. This implies that the unobservable component of tax-filing behavior, for both time and money spent, is very large compared to the component explained by the independent variables. In several cases these coefficients imply implausible predicted behavior of a taxpayer in a regime other than the one in which he or she is actually observed.
The large standard errors of the coefficients of the sample selection bias correction terms suggest that these implausible predictions are due to the multicollinearity of the estimate of the unobserved component of the choice of regime decision and the determinants of the conditional continuous choice of H and B.
Remember that the same set of exogenous variables explains both the choice of regime and the compliance behavior conditional on regime. That the two relationships may be identified is entirely due to the nonlinear relationship of the sample selection bias correction terms with the explanatory variables. In sum, the estimation technique is unable to distinguish precisely between the effect of the unobservable influences that determine the choice of regime and the effect of the explanatory variables that affect behavior within a regime.
What conclusions can be drawn from the regression results presented in Table 1 Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Shaw (1981, 1982 
